C1 - Coin Voting
The Proposal may impact any or all of the following; Nominated distribution of "Maha Emissions" via Gauge Vote, Inclusion/removal of "Maha Emission Gauges" (Bribes)
There are many definitions and refinements around this particular approach - quadratic voting and delegation methods that utilize a coin-weighted vote. Within context, we're referencing the calculation of
'1 coin = 1 vote'(excluding delegation).
Coin Weighted Governance Model
Arguably, the 'Free-Market' is a form of governance that is 'fiat-weighted' via shareholder and consumer preference. Generally speaking, traditional shareholders maintain a prerogative of maximizing profit, and the company or corporation is beholden to that goal. As a bi-product, philanthropy is seldom demonstrated beyond a marketing context.
What we have witnessed is capitalism, and the free market becomes undermined by bailouts and artificial value. The game's rules have been fundamentally changed, and quite literally, through monetary policy. This has led to a moral hazard that has diminished public trust in government institutions.
It's important to understand that we're opportunistic creatures, so great diligence is required to design the right strategy for the intended outcome. The issue here is not profit-seeking -- but rather when that purpose undermines broader consensus on all other matters.
As written in the following article by Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin, coin-voting has many pitfalls, such as vote buying, malicious governance attacks, and token centralization.
Giving complete governance power to coin-voting runs the risk of creating a plutocracy and centralizing supply. This impact, however, can be mitigated through adequate dispersion of the supply among holders.
CLASSIFICATION 1 - (C.1) The Proposal may impact any or all of the following;
- 1.Nominated distribution of "MAHA Emissions" via Gauge Vote
- 2.Inclusion/removal of "MAHA Emission Gauges" (Bribes)
C.1 Proposals will exclusively use coin-weighted voting and exclude the use of delegation.
We've identified the similarities between shareholder theory and coin-weighted voting, which guides us to limit proposal application to profit-gearing matters. In this way, the behavior that is incentivized has a positive impact on the protocol. For example;
As Maha has a reducing inflation rate over ten years, a specific amount of this is allocated for liquidity pools within the ecosystem. Here, it is ideal to implement a coin voting strategy that helps leverage buying demand; this, in turn counters the inflation aspect of
MAHA, and instead produces more scarcity as voters are required to time-lock
MAHAinto MAHAX for voting power.
Distribution of Maha Emissions to Liquidity Pools
- Gratuities (AKA 'Bribes') Proposals In this use case, external projects bid for inclusion into the MahaDAO ecosystem. In effect, expanding the farming options for liquidity pools. As with emission votes, new pools are eligible to receive
MAHAemissions as rewards. For the same considerations above, it makes sense to use a coin-weighted strategy again to induce more scarcity and demand.
Gratuities for voting support to include a new gauge
If you would like to submit a Gauge proposal to the MahaDAO, please see the following link and template: https://discuss.mahadao.com/c/governance/gauge-proposals/54